Andrew Cochran has got my attention. If the opinion rendered below is absolutely true, then I am willing to concede that the occupation of Iraq under the current premises is wrong. (emphasis mine).
On this anniversary of the entry of U.S. troops into Iraq, it's instructive to look back on the changes in opinions on the war as the nature of the conflict changed. Last month, "Army Magazine" published "The Modern Seven Pillars of Iraq," an essay by Lt. Col. Craig Trebilcock, U.S. Army Reserve, who served as a Judge Advocate and coordinated reconstruction of the Iraqi legal system, during a one-year deployment. Writing before the "surge" in U.S. troops into the region, Col. Trebilcock wrote pessimistically on the use of additional military force and recommended a political strategy based on what he views as seven "pillars" of Iraqi culture, one of which is: "The primary concern of Iraqi officials is not democracy or the political evolution of a successful Iraqi nationstate. It is the use of their position in government to gain personal wealth, as well as benefits for their extended family, tribe or sect." Trebilcock has come to the conclusion that the American ideal of democracy is simply not and will not be a part of Iraqi culture. "As the concept of democracy does not have significant value in Iraqi culture, the people’s willingness to fight and die for its success is virtually nonexistent. Instead, consistent with their cultural expectations, Iraqis will tend to use their official or security positions to gain personal and family advantage, even if “Rome” burns about them. The daily involvement of corrupt Iraqi police in kidnappings and extortion reflects this." (If this looks familiar to readers, see my recent post about the Iraqi police.) He concludes with a prediction of strategic defeat, "In the end, by ignoring the cultural and internal political realities of Iraq in favor of a one-dimensional approach based upon military remedies, the civilian leadership of our military will likely win the battle and lose the war."
There is more than a dichotomy here and so the dispensation is actually a bit more nuanced. But it does make a very big difference to me. First of all, understand that I see two wars. The first one is over and a big success. It was everything from Shock & Awe to Mission Accomplished, including 'Bring It On'. But I'd say it wasn't really officially over until Saddam was captured. It was all about toppling Iraq and finishing the job that Desert Storm left undone.
The second war, of occupation, stabilization and nation building is the one most likely to fail. It has certainly failed to be prosecuted in any way near the predictions of the strategic planners of the White House, whether or not they merit that title. There are many reasons for that, not the least of which is that the Pentagon itself really had no strategic model for the sort of war we are faced with in Iraq. The shorthand description could be characterized between the philosophies of Generals Petraeus and Ordierno. Petraeus was shaking hands with mullahs, handing out money and giving warnings when somebody was to be arrested so as not to offend any sensibilities. Ordierno was kicking ass, taking names and sending truckloads of prisoners to Abu Graibh. Now Ordierno had nothing to do with what went awry with the interrogators, but he was responsible for overcrowding the joint.
Depending on your faith in the Iraqi people's willingness to sacrifice for democracy, the right battlefield tactics are Petraeus' or Ordierno's. If you are trying to win hearts and minds and perform CT operations using intelligence gained from civilians dedicated to a peaceful building of democratic institutions, then Petraeus is your man. Everyone should understand that this has been Bush's choice even before Petraeus took command of the theatre. It is the path of nation building. It is the path of what you expect from liberated people.
But if you are a cynic, and it looks like the cynical view of the Iraqis in Anbar is the most realistic view, then you pacify rebel groups and sectarian death squads without respect to what the villagers think. You simply crush them. You crank up the Odierno-style iron fist, build huge POW camps and and de-testostify Iraq. If we had pursued that strategy from Day One of the Occupation, there would be no insurgency. But in our righteous desire to see Iraqis as equals, we decided instead to take the more civic-minded approach, which was to jumpstart their police forces.
Well it has turned out that the Iraqi police forces have been too slow and too corrupt for anyone but an optimist's timetable. Iraq is not in civil war, but the capital is not safe. Three steps backward. And so the Surge has taken us back to a more hardened stance leaving the Iraqi police training business for another day. Two steps forward.
So I think Trebilcock is basically saying that not only are the sectarian groups with their death squads and suicide bombers in it for the oil, but that much of the government is too. Now I've heard plenty talk which makes perfect sense in describing how long the people of Iraq have been without self-government (basically 40 years) and that they need time to get learn how to run a real democracy. This by high level officials and political scholars in Iraq. But given Maliki's dithering with Al Sadr, it's clear that he and a lot of people may be second-guessing.
There's no question in my mind that the Congressional attempt to force the President's hand with regard to the direction, size and shape of the military mission in Iraq is giving all parties in Iraq, be they good or evil, plenty of reasons to doubt American resolve. American resolve remains the most stable and honest strength in Iraq. If that goes, or even if it is threatened, every Iraqi with half a reptilian brain is going to be thinking survival tactics, not democratic institution building and strengthening. Further and most poignantly, this means bloodbath. Not only that, but whatever resources are gotten by those in power now, as goosed along by and protected by the US Military and all inheritances of the Provisional Government, will be the fattest dogs in the dump if it all goes feral.
So this is what the next president of the US will have to deal with.
If we stick to the Petraeus/Surge strategy, it's just going to take a long time, a lot of money and a lot of patience by the American public. This seems quite unlikely given those who want change for the sake of change.
If we go Odierno, then most of the humanitarian goals of the second war go out the window. Iraq without the benefit of the neoconservative doubt goes to an inefficient republic with strongarm and corrupt tendencies. We'll be running a police state with a huge number of men in prison. It sounds like the Kablooey Scenario. That may be the worst kind of peace.
If we go Obama, meaning we just pull the troops out on an American anti-war timetable rather than Maliki's timetable, then it's Hotel Rwanda in Iraq. Pure bloody genocide. But we'll have a President whose dazzling presence will distract us from all that. Hey, we tried, but Johnny needs health care.
If we go Clinton, which I interpret to mean that we de-Surge and go back to the pre-Surge deployment focused on training the Iraqi PD and probably giving the Baathists their army back, then we'll have more of the same death rates of the pre-Surge. Which means a rapid de-escalation of forces later rather than sooner. Pure bloody genocide later.
None of these options sound like victory to me, which is why this next election is even more important than 2004. Despite the acknowledged practical limits of neoconservatism, I still want victory.
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