Epicurean Friday finds us with the following thoughts from Galen Strawson:
If, in any normal, non-depressed period of life, I ask myself whether I’d rather be alive than dead tomorrow morning, and completely put aside the fact that some people would be unhappy if I were dead, I find I have no preference either way. The fact that I’m trying to finish a book, or about to go on holiday, or happy, or in love, or looking forward to something, makes no difference. More specifically: when I put this question to myself and suppose that my death is going to be a matter of instant annihilation, completely unexperienced, completely unforeseen, it seems plain to me that I—the human being that I am now, GS—would lose nothing. My future life or experience doesn’t belong to me in such a way that it’s something that can be taken away from me. It can’t be thought of as possession in that way. To think that it’s something that can be taken away from me is like thinking that life could be deprived of life, or that something is taken away from an existing piece of string by the fact that it isn’t longer than it is. It’s just a mistake, like thinking that Paris is the capital of Argentina.
I’ll call this view No Ownership of the Future—NOF for short. Most will think it absurd, and I don’t expect to be able to change their minds. A few, though, will know immediately what I mean and think it obvious. It’s worth noting that it can take some effort to imagine one’s imminent death in a vivid way and at the same time imagine that it’s completely unforeseen, so that life is absolutely normal up to the moment of annihilation. (There is no fear, no suffering. Nothing bad is experienced.)
NOF isn’t a position taken up after reflection on Epicurus’ famously unsatisfying argument that death is not an evil. (This, briefly, has two parts: [1] You don’t mind that that you didn’t exist for an eternity before you were born, so you shouldn’t mind if you don’t exist for an eternity after you’re dead, [2] there’s no one there after death to experience harm, so no harm is done to anyone, so death is not a harm.) In the case of people like myself NOF is a natural, untutored, pre-philosophical given. It’s compatible with fear of death, which I feel, and it has nothing to do with Epicurus’ argument, which is meant to be a palliative or cure for fear of death. It isn’t meant to make anyone feel better about death, much as I would like to. It’s just a report of what I find I think—feel.
Interesting. If I had a bit more time this morning, I would like to contrast this point of view with that which was articulated some time ago regarding a society that is actually put in such a position by the fact that it had been rendered sterile. The most popular expression of this was the film Children of Men, which I hated by the way. But I do tend toward the argument that a childless future would be psychologically crushing to society despite this marvelous position of NOF. Obviously I make the distinction between my own continued existence and that of my offspring and the repercussions of some individual choices and that which is forced upon an individual or society. But NOF is a startling sort of prophylactic against certain religious promises and implied social and moral commitments. I see it in political discussions as well.
What happens when people disinvest in the future? It can't be good.
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